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Akamai: A Cure for Medical Process Patent's
Prometheus Ailment?
by JOANNA LIEBES*

I. Introduction
In its recent decision, Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court
addressed the subject matter eligibility of process claims containing a
law of nature as a limiting element.' The Court reiterated the longstanding rule that laws of nature are not patentable, but that
applications of them may be patent-eligible.2 After Mayo, the fate of
medical process patents related to naturally occurring correlations
seemed to be in jeopardy.' The Court attempted to distinguish
between unpatentable concepts and practical applications of those
concepts, but left many in the biotech and medical industries
wondering how to draft patent-eligible claims. Practitioners have
been forced to rethink claiming strategies, and at best, this decision
has made their task significantly more challenging and uncertain.4
Many law firms have provided guidance on how to approach drafting
claims to prevent a subject matter eligibility rejection from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"),' and the USPTO

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013; B.S.,
Mechanical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, 2008. I would like to
graciously thank Professor Jeffrey Lefstin for his insight, suggestions, and assistance
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the editors of the Hastings
Science and Technology Law Journal for their hard work throughout the year.

1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
2. Id. at 1293-94.
3. See Angela L. Morrison, Mayo v. Prometheus: Patent Eligibility of Claims
Covering NaturalLaws, 41 COLO. LAW. 77,81 (2012).
4. Christopher Holman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Implications of Prometheus v.
Mayo for Biotechnology, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Apr. 3,
2012), http://www.genengnews.com/blog-biotech/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-implications

-of-i-prometheus-i-i-v-mayo-i-for-biotechnology/679 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
5. See, e.g., Robert M. Shulman & David A. Kelly, Hunton & Williams LLP,

Presentation, Subject-Matter Eligibility in the Wake of Mayo v. Prometheus (Apr. 20,
[309]
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has provided examiners with its own detailed guidance on how to
address these types of claims. At worst, this decision has depleted
any remaining value from medical diagnostic patents because many
patent-eligible claims post-Mayo would be difficult to infringe.'
This note will discuss the problem of subject matter eligibility for
medical process patents post-Mayo as it relates to the likelihood of
infringement of those patents. After the Mayo decision, practitioners
are attempting to redraft claims to ensure they contain patent eligible
subject matter, but in doing so, they may be drafting claims that are
impossible to directly infringe. Put another way, in order to cure the
subject matter eligibility deficiency of medical process patents,
practitioners may be forced to add steps to method claims that
require additional actors to complete. This means that no one actor
would complete all of the steps of the method, and therefore, there
would be no direct infringer. This note proposes that the Federal
Circuit, in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,8
effectively provided a solution to this problem by readdressing the
law of divided infringement in the inducement context. Despite all of
the industry and academic focus on the Mayo decision,9 without
Akamai,"' many medical process patents, while they may still exist,
would be worthless.
This note will begin by providing context with a brief
introduction to medical process patents and patent subject matter
eligibility. To fully explain the implications of both the Mayo and
Akamai decisions on medical process claims, this note will explore the
prominent decisions leading up to both cases.
Following the
exploration of the Mayo line of cases, this note will discuss the
application of the principles outlined in Mayo in cases decided after
2012), available at http://www.hunton.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Events/PrometheusPresentation.pdf.
6. Memorandum of Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Interim Procedure for Subject Mater
Eligibility Analysis of Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter
Hirshfeld Memorandum], http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/2012_ interim-guidance.
pdf (last accessed Oct. 20, 2012).
7. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae, Myriad Genetics, Inc., in Support of
Neither Party, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012) (No.
2009-1372), at 17 (recognizing, before a final determination in Mayo-which made it more
difficult to obtain medical process patents relating to laws of nature-that requiring an
analysis step in diagnostic process patents leaves applicants to receive a worthless patent
that can easily be infringed due to the Court's joint infringement decisions).
8. 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (2012).
9. 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).
10. See infra notes 7 and 8.
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the landmark decision and the guidance provided by the USPTO.
This will be followed by an analysis of an exemplary medical process
claim containing a naturally occurring correlation, which highlights
the practical difficulties created by Mayo. An explanation of possible
deficiencies of the claim post-Mayo will be provided and possible
remedies will be proposed. Finally, after a discussion of the Akamai
line of cases and the decision itself, this note will demonstrate how
Akamai potentially saves the exemplary claim from worthlessness and
will discuss a potential problem that still remains.
II. Introduction to Medical Process Patents
Originally, medical processes were not considered patent-eligible
subject matter." Case law addressing medical process patent disputes
dates back to the 19th century, when in Morton v. New York Eye
Infirmary a patent owner sought to recover damages for infringement
of a patent covering a procedure for administering ether to surgical
patients as an anesthetic.' The court acknowledged the usefulness of
the method but held that it was not patentable.' 3 Courts thereafter
"interpreted this holding as prohibiting the patenting of any medical
procedures."14 In 1945, the Patent Office Board of Appeals explicitly
held that "methods or modes of treatment of physicians of certain
diseases are not patentable."1 5 Several years later, in 1954, the Patent
Office Board of Appeals overruled its prior decision and
reestablished the patent eligibility of medical and surgical processes
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Generally, medical and surgical procedures remain patent
eligible subject matter. 6 However, the scope of enforceability of
medical process patents has been significantly limited through
legislative means." Legislative action came in response to outrage

11. Scott D. Anderson, A Right Without a Remedy: The Unenforceable Medical
ProcedurePatent,3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117, 122 (1999).

12. Id. (citing Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, No. 9,865
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)).
13. Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 883.
14. Anderson, supra note 11, at 123.
15. Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 797, 798 (1945) (reviewing 24 Comm'n
Manuscript Decision 349 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1883) (Case No. 182)).
16. Anderson, supra note 11, at 130-131 (explaining the unenforceability of medical
process patents against a medical practitioner's performance of a medial activity under 35
U.S.C. §§ 271 (a) or (b), 281, 283, 284 and 285).
17. Id.

312

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:2

over the 1995 case of Pallin v. Singer.'
There, Pallin, an
ophthalmologist, sued for patent infringement when another
ophthalmologist used his method of performing cataract surgery
without stitches.'
After the American Medical Association
("AMA") expressed concern that medical process patents could lead
to inadvertent infringement by medical professionals, Congress
amended the Patent Act to prevent enforcement of such patents
against medical practitioners directly infringing, or induced infringing
acts, if completed in the course of medical activity. 2° Despite this
limitation on enforcement, many believe that without the security of
the patent system, investment in the biotechnology industry would
undoubtedly decrease. 1 Therefore, medical process patents remain
an important tool for many in the industry.
III. Introduction to Subject Matter Eligibility
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter
and states that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new2
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor. ,
The section 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is a threshold test. 2" Even if
an invention potentially qualifies for a patent under this section, in
order to receive the Patent Act's protection, the claimed invention
must also satisfy additional requirements included in the Act.24
Similarly, section 101 is "'a coarse eligibility filter,' not the final
arbiter of patentability,"" and it "does not permit a court to reject
subject matter
categorically because it finds that a claim is not worthy
26
of patent.,

18. Pallin v. Singer, Civ. A. No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996).
19. See Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and
Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PRoP. 280, 285 (2010) (discussing Pallin v. Singer).
20. Id. at 21-22.
21. Julianne Befeler, Seeking A Better Prescriptionfor Physicians: Patent Eligibility for
DiagnosticMethods in A Post-Bilski and Prometheus Era, SEATON HALL LEGIS. J. 484, 50809 (2011) (discussing the importance of patent protection for diagnostic method patents).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
23. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
24. Id.; see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (obviousness).
25. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 (2011)
(quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
26. Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 869.
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The Court has recognized three specific exceptions to section
101's patent eligibility criteria: "laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are not patentable." In drafting the 1952 Patent
Act, Congress intended to provide a broad scope for patent eligibility
in order to encourage ingenuity.2
These exceptions are not
statutorily required, but they have been recognized since the 19th
century and they reflect the notion that a patentable process must be
new and useful. 9 Additionally, these exceptions encompass the
"basic tools of scientific and technological work, which are free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none."'3'
In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court addressed how the natural law
exception to subject matter eligibility applied to a medical process
patent claiming a correlation between a certain metabolite level in a
patient's blood and pharmaceutical effectiveness. 3 Leading up to this
decision, the Court heard a series of cases discussing the nonstatutory exceptions to section 101. In 1948, in Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court reiterated the law of nature
exception when it held unpatentable product claims reciting a
combination of individually naturally occurring species of bacteria.32
Most of the cases following Funk Brothers but prior to Mayo involved
software claims and the abstract idea exception. These cases provide
additional direction on how to apply the subject matter eligibility
exceptions and a more thorough discussion of the abstract idea
exception.3 While the decisions contain some inconsistencies, the
Mayo decision concludes this line of discussion by combining four
interrelated ideas seen throughout this jurisprudence: insignificant
pre- or post-solution activity; the application of the law of nature or
abstract idea; preemption; and how to address the claimed steps,
individually or as a whole. Since these ideas can encompass each
other and can easily be conflated, an appropriate section 101 analysis
need not consider each individually, as long as the underlying
rationale of each is addressed. The following section will track how

27.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).

28. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
29. Id.; see Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
30. OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293).
31. 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
32. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
33. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1982).
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the Court has developed and applied these ideas, concluding with its
most recent pronouncement in Mayo.
IV. Noteworthy Supreme Court Cases on the Road to Mayo
Funk Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant
In Funk Brothers, the Court laid the foundation for its later
discussion of the application of a law of nature to new and useful
ends. 4 The Court clearly reaffirmed its decision in Le Roy v.
TathaMn that the discovery of a law of nature is not patent-eligible.6
The Court explained that laws of nature are free to everyone, so an
invention must come from the inventive application of the law of
nature.37 The concept that an inventive application of a law of nature
is patent-eligible is continually referenced in the cases leading up to
Mayo, and in Mayo itself.
Gottschalk v. Benson
In Gottschalk v. Benson,"8 the Court discussed both if and how an
abstract idea can be applied to a new end, and the intertwined idea of
preemption. In this case the Court considered whether the claimed
method of programming a general-purpose computer was indeed a
patent-eligible discovery, or merely a mathematical formula without
any practical application. 4' Following on ideas expressed in Funk
Brothers, the Court explained that phenomena of nature (even if just
discovered), mental processes, and abstract ideas are not patentable
because they are the basic tools of science and technology.41 If laws of
nature, mental processes, or abstract ideas themselves were
patentable, without any meaningful application, the protection a
patent affords would prevent others from building on foundational
scientific knowledge. The Court noted that "a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth" might
be patentable, 4' but explained that allowing a patent on the claimed
34. See Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130.
35. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
36. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130.
37. Id.
38. Gottschalk v. Benson at 409 U.S. 63.
39. Id. at 71-72.
40.
41.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 67.

42.

Id.
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method, without application except in relation to a general purpose
computer, would "wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
43
practical effect would be [allowing] a patent on the algorithm itself.
So, in light of its discussion regarding the lack of application of the
abstract idea and the current claims' ability to preempt future
innovation, the Court held the process patent-ineligible.
Parkerv. Flook
In Parker v. Flook, the Court presented a method of analyzing a
claimed process that includes a law of nature, abstract idea or mental
process, the idea of a claim containing an "inventive concept," and
the concept of "conventional post-solution activity., 44 The patent at
issue in this case was directed toward a method of updating alarm
limits during the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. 45 The
Court noted that the mathematical algorithm in the process was the
only distinguishing element between conventional methods and the
claimed method.46 With this backdrop, the Court analyzed the claim
assuming the algorithm was within the prior art. 4' The Court
disclaimed the relevance of the novelty of the mathematical algorithm
and explained that once it was assumed to be part of the prior art, the
application contained no patentable invention.4
The Court
considered the claims as a whole only in relation to its method of
analysis: Assume the law of nature or abstract idea is part of the prior
art, then determine if the remaining application of the law of nature
or abstract idea is inventive. 49 Flook argued that the addition of postsolution activity distinguished his method from that in Benson, and
therefore made his process patentable.'
The Court vehemently
disagreed, explaining that allowing post-solution activity to remedy
the patent ineligibility of a law of nature or an abstract idea "exalt[ed]
form over substance."' The Court held Flook's method recited an
unpatentable abstract idea, and the addition of conventional post-

43. Id. at 71-72.
44. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 590, 590-94 (1978).

45. Id. at 585-86.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 591-94.

48. Id. at 594.
49. Id. (stating "once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, consideredas a whole, contains no patentable invention") (emphasis added).
50. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
51.

Id.
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solution activity failed to convert it into an inventive application of
that idea. 52
Diamond v. Diehr
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court continued to rely on the
interrelated ideas of preemption, post-solution activity and how the
natural law is applied in analyzing subject matter eligibility, but it
rejected the method of claim analysis presented in Flook." In Diehr,
the claimed invention was a "process for molding raw, uncured
synthetic rubber into cured precision products," by constantly
measuring the actual temperature inside a mold shaping the material
and using this data, in combination with a programmed computer, to
repeatedly recalculate the cure time. 4 The Court acknowledged that
several steps of the claimed method relied on a mathematical
equation and a digital computer, but explained that their inclusion in
the method did not prevent it from being patentable. 5' The Court
concluded that the claims at issue applied a mathematical formula in
a process that was performing a function that patent law was designed
to protect-an industrial process for molding synthetic rubber-and
was therefore patent eligible."6
In reaching this result, the Court emphasized that to determine
subject matter eligibility under section 101, the claims must be
examined as a whole. 7 Repudiating its decision in Flook,5" the Court
explained that it is inappropriate to analyze the elements of a process
claim individually. 5' Separating a claim into new elements and old
elements, then ignoring the old elements is improper because a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable despite all of the
steps being previously well known or in common use before the
combination.6 The Court clarified that the "novelty of any element
or step in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in

52. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 590, 590-94 (1978).

53. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
54. Id. at 177-79.

55. Id. at 185.
56. Id. at 192-93.

57. Id. at 188.
58. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).

59. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
60. Id.
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determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the
6 1
section 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.
The Court also continued to consider whether the proposed
claims attempted to preempt future innovation, and whether they
actually applied the mathematical formula or merely recited it with
appended insignificant post-solution activity.62 The Court explained
that while the claimed process employed a well-known mathematical
equation, it did not seek to preempt the use of the equation.6 Rather,
it only prevented others from using the equation in conjunction with
the remaining steps of the method, which does not present a bar to
patent-eligibility. 4 In distinguishing Flook, the Court explained that
here the invention is not a mathematical formula, but an application
of that formula to a process for curing synthetic rubber.6' The
claimed application of the equation does not wholly preempt it from
further general use. 6 In contrast, in Flook, the patent claimed a
formula for computing an alarm limit with no additional meaningful6
disclosure, which amounted to claiming the formula itself.
Additionally, the Court reiterated that the addition of "insignificant
post-solution activity will not convert an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process. 6' Analyzing all of the elements of the proposed
claim together, the Court found that the proposed method did not
preempt further use of the mathematical equation. Thus, the method
was not merely the equation with the addition of a conventional postsolution activity, but was an application of the formula to an
industrial process that was patent-eligible.69
V. Mayo v. Prometheus
In Mayo, the Court again confronted whether a claimed process
constituted patent-eligible subject matter or an unpatentable

61. Id. at 188-89 (The Court recognized that the injection of the novelty analysis into
subject matter eligibility may be the result of the "new and useful" language in section 101,
but failed to acknowledge its conflation of these concepts in its previous cases, for
example, in Parkerv. Flook.).
62. Id. at 188,192.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id.

65. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 186-87.
68. Id. at 188, 191-92 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).

69. See id. at 191-92.
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exception to section 101. While the decision does not clearly explain
how to address subject-eligibility concerns going forward, it does
build on the foundation the Court laid in its prior precedent. The
decision compiles the intertwined ideas regarding subject matter
eligibility expressed in the cases leading up to this decision:
preemption, application, pre- or post-solution activity, and the
method of claim analysis.
The claims at issue cover a medical process that informs a doctor
using thiopurine drugs to treat patients with autoimmune diseases
about the efficacy of a given dosage of the drug." In response to
ingesting a thiopurine drug, the human body will metabolize the drug
and form metabolites,1 specifically 6-thioguanine (6-TG) and 6methyl-mercaptopurine (6-MMP), in the blood. 2 Each person,
however, metabolizes thiopurine drugs differently."
Therefore,
although it was known in the field that 6-TG and 6-MMP were
associated with the effectiveness of a particular dosage of a thiopurine
drug, the precise correlations between these metabolite levels and
efficacy or harm were unknown. 4 Prometheus's claims cover a
method embodying the discovery that blood concentration levels of 6TG or 6-MMP beyond a certain amount indicates an over-dose of the
thiopurine drug, while concentration levels of the metabolites below a
certain amount indicates an under-dose of the thiopurine drug."
Prometheus sells diagnostic tests that embody the claimed process,
and for a time, sold these tests to Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo

70. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).

71. Metabolites are a substance essential to the metabolism of a particular organism
or to a particular metabolic process. They are usually small molecules and have various
functions, for example, fuel or signaling. Metabolite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metabolite (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
72.

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.

73.

Id.

74.
75.

Id.
Id.

Prometheus' claim 1: "A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for

treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering
a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder; and (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said

immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than
about 230 pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the

amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject." U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623
col. 20,11.10-20 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
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Collaborative Services ("Mayo") .
However, in 2004, Mayo
announced it would begin using and selling its own test with a slight
variation and Prometheus commenced an action for patent
infringement.
The Court found that Prometheus's claims were directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter because they claimed a relationship
between a specific metabolite and the likelihood that a specific
dosage of a thiopurine drug was ineffective or harmful, which is a law
of nature. In coming to its decision, the Court discussed the main
ideas of subject matter eligibility seen in the cases leading up to
Mayo. First, the Court emphasized that a process reciting a law of
nature, without additional features that prevent monopolization of
the law itself, is not patentable. 79 Allowing Prometheus' claims to
stand would "risk disproportionately tying up the use of the
underlying natural laws," thus inappropriately preempting further
innovation."' Second, the Court reiterated that a process that focuses
on the use of a law of nature must contain other elements, or a
combination of elements, that amount to an "inventive concept" or
an inventive application of the law. 1 An inventor must do more than
state a law of nature and add the words "apply it." ' Prometheus's
claims instructed doctors to gather data and draw inferences in light
of a naturally occurring correlation, which the Court held is not
inventive. s
And, third, the Court again explained that "the
prohibition against patenting a [natural law] cannot be circumvented
by adding insignificant post-solution activity.' '0 4 Prometheus's claims
informed a relevant audience about a specific natural law with
additional well-understood, conventional activity that amounted to no
more than insignificant pre-solution activity."s This was not enough to
convert the unpatentable law of nature into a patentable application

76. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
77.

Id. at 1296.

78. Id.

79. Id. at 1297.
80. Id. at 1294.
81. Id.
82. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.

83. Id. at 1298.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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of that law. 6 The Court found Prometheus's claims undeserving of a
patent because they effectively claimed the underlying law of nature."
The Court did not provide direct instruction on which model of
claim analysis is appropriate (the model presented in Flook or in
Diehr) and instead used both of the two previously presented
techniques. In analyzing Prometheus's claims, the Court broke the
claims into three basic steps: an administering-the-drug step, a
determining-the-level-of-metabolite step, and a wherein step which
informs the doctor of a need to increase or decrease the amount of
drug."8
The Court then engaged in an analysis of each step
individually, similar to method used in Flook. ' However, after
considering and dismissing each of the three steps, the Court
addressed the steps as an ordered combination, citing Diehr.9° While
most of the opinion consists of analysis of each of the claimed steps
individually, the Court repeatedly refers to viewing those steps as a
whole.91 Additionally, the Court did not explicitly state that the law
of nature should be assumed to be part of the prior art.12 The Court's
analysis arguably contained both methodologies or a combination of
the two, and did not explicitly promote or reject one over the other.
It is unclear if the Court intended to revert back to the Flook method
of claim analysis by engaging in mostly that type of discussion.
However, without a clear directive, the Diehr methodology appears
to still be good law.
The Mayo court does explicitly discuss both Diehr and Flook,
and finds the claims at issue present a weaker case for patentability
than the patent-eligible claims in Diehr and a case no stronger than
the patent-ineligible claims in Flook.93 The Court distinguished Diehr
by focusing on the fact that the Diehr court never suggested that the
steps of the claimed method, or at least the combination of steps,
were obvious or conventional. 4 Therefore, the additional steps

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1305.
88. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98.
89. Id. at 1297.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1297-99.
92. See id. at 1289.

93. Id. at 1299.
94. The Diehr Court did not engage in an "obviousness" or "novelty" analysis

because it rejected the relevance of such considerations in subject matter eligibility. See
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
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transformed the process into an inventive application without
preempting further use of the equation. Flook, the Court explained,
did no more than provide an unpatentable formula and add wellknown steps such that the claims involved no inventive concept at
all." Since the claims at issue in Mayo consisted of a law of nature
and "well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously
engaged in by those in the field," and since applying the law of nature
necessitated taking the steps in order, the Court found the claims
closer to those in Flook than those in Diehr 7 The Court also
distinguished the claimed process in Neilson v. Harford by explaining
that the process included, beyond the law of nature, "several
unconventional stepsv ... that confined the claims to a particular,
useful application of the principle.""
While the Court did not provide any specific guidance as to how
to remedy the patent-ineligibility of process claims relating to a law of
nature, it seemed to suggest two specific instances in which it would
uphold similar claims. The Court declined to decide whether the
claim at issue in Mayo would be patent eligible if the included steps
were less conventional, highlighting only that the included steps
added nothing of significance." But, in contrast to the steps at issue,
the Court suggested that a patent on a new drug, or a new way of
using an existing drug, would remain patentable because its reach
would be confined to a particular application of the laws of nature it
is built upon.1 0.
VI. Application of Mayo to Recent Cases and the USPTO's
Guidance
Now the question becomes how to determine what is patent
eligible subject matter in a post-Mayo world. Since the Federal
Circuit's decision in Myriad did not provide much guidance on how to

95. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1299-1300.
98. Neilson v. Harford, Web. Pat. Cases 295, 371 (1841), is an English case in which a
patent applicant asserted a claim covering a method for improved application of air to
produce heat using a blowing apparatus. The court found the process explained how the

law of nature-that hot air promotes ignition- could be implemented in an inventive way.
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300.
99. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.

100. Id.
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approach process claims with a law of nature as a limiting element,""1
an examination of the PTO's and district courts' interpretations of
Mayo may be helpful. Post-Mayo decisions and the Patent Office's
interim guidance on the case have both continued discussion of the
role of preemption and how natural law is to be applied, as well as the
relative insignificance of post-solution activity. While the PTO's
guidance does not explicitly address the status of the Diehr and Flook
methods of analysis after Mayo, it explains that a claim should be
evaluated by considering the additional steps beyond the natural law
and a combination of all of the steps.1°2 Thus, the USPTO's guidance
implies both inquires remain relevant."°3 Generally, to increase
patent-eligibility post-Mayo, the steps of a claim, either alone or in
combination, must recite an application of a law of nature that is
specific enough not to preempt all future uses of the natural law and
that does not merely contain the natural law and conventional pre- or
post-solution activity. Additionally, as seen in Classen, the addition
of a treatment step may transform a natural law into a practical
application of the law and therefore may increase the likelihood of
patent eligibility.
A. Post-Mayo Cases
The district court cases relating to subject matter eligibility
decided since Mayo prove to be instructive. This section summarizes
the Court's subject matter eligibility jurisprudence relating to
methods incorporating laws of nature as it stands after the Mayo
decision and discusses the decision's application to recently filed
cases.
In one recent district court decision, after reviewing a large
portion of section 101 jurisprudence, the court summarized
instructive principles for analyzing subject-matter eligibility of
method claims incorporating a law of nature post-Mayo."4 The court
reiterated that "a patent may not simply restate laws of nature ... or
apply them in some rudimentary fashion; instead, the invention must

101. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.

Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), vacated, appeal reinstated,467 F. App'x 890
(Fed. Cir. 2012).

102. See Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6.
103. Id.
104. OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at
"12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11,2012).
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add some 'innovative concept' to 'transform the process into an
inventive application of the ...law of nature."1 ' °5 This principle
requires inventive application of the law of nature and adding
insignificant or conventional steps is not enough. Additionally, the
court discussed the role of preemption in determining patentability of
1process.
The court explained that when determining if a patent
preempts a field of use, the inquiry is "whether 'upholding the patents
would risk disproportionately tying up the underlying ...natural
laws, inhibiting their use in making further discoveries.""' The court
failed to address the appropriate methodology for analyzing a process
claim, possibly because the Mayo decision left this unclear.
In Classen v. Biogen, the District Court of Maryland confronted
these issues in the context of medical process patents on
reconsideration of its order denying a motion to dismiss Classen's
claims for unpatentability.... The patents at issue recited methods for
choosing an immunization schedule for infants to minimize the
likelihood of developing immune-related disorders or infectious
diseases.9 They contain three basic steps: an identifying step, which
selects two groups (one immunized by one schedule, the second
immunized by a second schedule); a comparing step, which compares
the effectiveness of the two immunization schedules to identify which
is the higher or lower risk schedule; and an immunizing step, which
immunizes according to the identified lower-risk schedule."
The
Court determined that despite the possibility that Classen's patents
may recite a law of nature with the instruction "apply it," a process
clearly held patent-ineligible in Mayo, the reasoning used to

105.
106.

Id. at 12 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1292).
Id. at 12 (citing Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294).

107. Id.
108. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, CIV. WDQ-04-2607, 2012 WL
3264941, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2012). The procedural history of this case is slightly more
complex and deserves explanation. On August 31, 2011, the Federal Circuit held that two
of the patents at issue in this case contained patent-eligible subject matter. See id. On
February 3, 2012, Classen filed an amended complaint at the district court alleging
infringement of those two patents, and an additional patent not considered by the Federal
Circuit. On May 30, 2012, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim and concluded that additional briefing in light of Mayo was not needed, but
provided Classen the opportunity to file a third amended complaint. GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK), the named defendant along with Biogen IDEC, asked for reconsideration in light
of the Mayo decision. After additional complaints and briefs were filed, the Court granted

reconsideration.
109. Sd. at
N5.
110. See U.S. Patent No. 6,638,739 col. 52 11.21-57 (filed Apr. 18, 2002).
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invalidate such claims in Mayo did not apply to Classen's claims.111
First, similar to the argument made in Diehr, and recognized in Mayo,
the District Court found the record insufficient to enable it to
conclude that the claims involved "well-understood, routine [or]
conventional activity."" 2
Additionally, and arguably more
importantly for future applications of Mayo, the Court relied on the
presence of a mandatory application step (the immunization step) in
addition to the data-gathering step, which was absent from the claims4
in Mayo. ' 13 The Court relied on the prior Federal Circuit's opinion"1
in dismissing Classen's contention that the prohibition on
transforming patent ineligible laws of nature into patentable subject
matter by adding insignificant post-solution activity was newly
created in Mayo."' Thus, the Court suggested, in agreement with the
Federal Circuit,1 that the process recited in the claims at issue was
more than a law of nature with added post-solution activity, it was a
specific application, and therefore patent eligible."'
B. USPTO Guidance
In response to the Mayo decision, the USPTO issued a
memorandum providing examiners guidance for analyzing the subject
matter eligibility of process claims involving laws of nature as a
limiting element or step."' While the instructions in this document do
not carry the same weight as judicial decisions, they delineate how
examiners should issue rejections to pending applications. If a
practitioner's goal is to avoid a section 101 rejection in the first place,
these guidelines may prove useful."' If nothing else, they provide a
floor on which a practitioner can build his claim, as the Patent Office

111. Classen, 2012 WL 3264941, at *4.
112. Specifically because this issue was being addressed on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Id.
113. Id. at5.
114. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (2011)
(relying on Bilski and Diehr).
115. Classen, 2012 WL 3264941, at *5.
116. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1068 (after reciting the rule regarding the insignificance of
adding post-solution activity, explaining that the additional step of immunization moves
the claims from an abstract scientific principle to a specific application).
117. Classen, 2012 WL 3264941, at *5.
118. Hirshfeld Memorandumsupra note 6.
119. Note that the goal is not to get invalid claims issued in light of Mayo. The point is
that the USPTO's guidance may provide useful information to practitioners interpreting
Mayo, and this author believes it is worth considering.
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is the gatekeeper of the patent system and issuance must occur before
a suit for infringement or invalidity.
The USPTO memorandum summarized the issue presented
when examining claims of this type as "whether the claim includes
additional elements/steps or a combination of elements/steps that
integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention such that [it]
is practically applied, and are sufficient to ensure that the claim
amounts to significantly more than the natural principle itself."12
While this inquiry does not especially illuminate the status of the law
post-Mayo, the memorandum goes on to provide a solid framework
for examiners when issuing rejections. 2' Practitioners can therefore
use this framework to aid in avoiding such rejections. The analysis of
a proposed process claim containing a law of nature as an element
consists of a three-step inquiry.2 2 First, not surprisingly, it must be
established that the claimed invention is directed to a process.' A
process is defined as an act, or a series of acts.'1 4 If the claim is not
directed toward a process, then Mayo does not apply.' 2 Second, it
must be determined that the "claim focus[es] on [the] use of a law of
nature, a natural phenomenon or [a] naturally occurring relation or
correlation (collectively referred to as a natural principle .... ""'
Once these threshold inquiries are answered affirmatively, the actual
analysis begins. Third, the examiner, and therefore the practitioner,
must decide if the claim integrates the natural principle into the
invention such that it is an application of the law of nature, claims
more than the natural principle itself, and is more than a recited law
of nature with instructions to apply it. 2 If this inquiry can be
answered affirmatively, the claims cover patent-eligible subject
matter and can then be analyzed under the remaining statutory
requirements. 21
While at first glance this three-inquiry process does not appear to
provide much instruction at all, on closer inspection the

120. Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Id. For information on other statutory requirements for the issuance of a patent
see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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memorandum provides useful clarification as to how to apply the
second and third inquiries, as well as valuable examples of how to
apply the inquiry process. The memorandum clarifies the definition
of a natural principle as the handiwork of nature without the hand of
man and provides an example relevant to the analysis of medical
process and diagnostic patents: "a correlation that occurs naturally
when a man-made product, such as a drug, interacts with a naturally
'
occurring substance, such as blood."129
With regard to the third
inquiry, the memorandum clarifies that it is not necessary for every
claimed element to integrate the natural principle, as long as it is
applied in some practical manner that does not amount to postsolution activity.1" The memorandum provides an example of such
post-solution activity: In a claim with steps correlating the presence of
specific bacterium in blood to a bacterial infection, the step of
recording the diagnosis on a chart is insufficient to integrate the
correlation into the invention. Additionally, it provides examples of
claims the PTO would consider patent eligible: claiming a natural
correlation in combination with a novel drug, or a new use of an
existing drug.1"2 These claims pass the three-inquiry test because they
amount to significantly more than claiming the natural correlation,
and although the examples suggest novelty or non-obviousness is
required, the memorandum expressly denies this.133
The
memorandum concludes with a list of nine factors to consider when
answering the third inquiry and a step-by-step application of the
three-inquiry
method to sample claims, including the claims in
134
Mayo.

VII. Proposed Sample Claim
A sample claim analysis may help demonstrate the profound
effect of Mayo on medical process patents and the importance of
Akamai in salvaging them. Consider the following sample claim 1:

129. Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 4 ("A claim that recites a novel drug or a new use of an existing drug, in
combination with a natural principle, would be sufficiently specific to be eligible because
the claim would amount to significantly more than the natural principle itself. However, a

claim does not have to be novel or non-obvious to qualify as a subject matter eligible
claim.").
134. Id. at 4-12.
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A method for assessing the effectiveness of a treatment for sleep
apnea, wherein said method comprises:
determining whether or not the level of expression of a nucleic
acid in a mammal being treated for sleep apnea changes during sleep,
wherein a change in said level during sleep indicates that said treatment
is ineffective."
VIII. Implications of Mayo on Sample Claim and Proposed
Remedies
Proceeding through the three-inquiry analysis, the threshold
inquiries are easily satisfied. First, sample claim 1 clearly recites a
process because it is a method with concrete steps. Second, the claim
focuses on a naturally occurring relation, specifically, the relationship
between a nucleic acid in a mammal and the occurrence of sleep
apnea. The third inquiry is also easily addressed. This claim does not
contain any application steps at all and amounts to the natural
principle
136 itself, the correlation between a nucleic acid and sleep
apnea.
Since a law of nature is not patentable without more,
neither is a process reciting the law of nature.137 This claim, if patent
eligible, would monopolize the correlation between the nucleic acid
and sleep apnea, precisely the result the Mayo Court was trying to
avoid.
Additionally, this claim is similar to, but even weaker than, the
patent-ineligible claim in Mayo. This claim, like the claim in Mayo,
contains a "determining step."
This step tells the scientist to
determine if there is a change in a patient's nucleic acid expression
during sleep through whatever process she wishes and informs the
scientist of the natural law. 38 The Court found the "administering
step" in Mayo merely narrowed the audience of the claim, which did
not cure its ineligibility.1"9 This claim does not include an
administering step and fails to narrow its scope in any way. For many

135. This claim was filed as claim 10 in U.S. Patent Appl. No. 12/680,073 (filed Sept. 8,
2010). The claim is likely indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, however, in the application in

which it was filed a dependent claim following this claim specifies which nucleic acids are
covered by the claims.
136. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
137. Id. at 1297.
138. See id.
139. Id.
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reasons,
this claim, as it stands, fails to be patent-eligible after
140
Mayo.
In order to make this claim patent-eligible, additional steps must
be added to integrate the natural principle into the claimed invention
and practically apply it in a way that amounts to more than the
natural principle itself. 141 The additional steps, either alone or in
combination with the existing steps, must prevent the claims from
preempting all future use of the correlation, apply the natural
principle in an inventive way, and must do more than add
insignificant post-solution activity.'42 A possible variation could be
sample claim 2:
A method for assessing the effectiveness of a treatment for sleep
apnea, wherein said method comprises: administeringtreatment X for
sleep apnea to a mammal before sleep; determining whether or not the
level of expression of a nucleic acid in a mammal being treated .for
sleep apnea changes duringsleep, wherein a change in said level during
sleep indicates that treatment X is ineffective; and modifying treatment
X based on the level change identified.
This claim is stronger than sample claim 1 and the claim found
ineligible in Mayo. Depending on what treatment X is, this claim may
have a high likelihood of being patent eligible. As with sample claim
1, this claim is clearly directed toward a process and focuses on the
same natural correlation-the relationship between a nucleic acid and
sleep apnea. The question of patent eligibility again hinges on the
third-inquiry identified in the USPTO's guidance: if the additional
steps, here the administering and modifying treatment steps,
individually or in combination, integrate the law of nature such that it
is practically applied and limited in scope (i.e., not preemptive).14 1 It
seems quite clear that the administering step, alone, or in
combination with the determining and wherein steps, is insufficient to
transform the claim. If the only addition to the claim is the

140. Although this specific claim was not elected for continued prosecution in response

to a restriction requirement, similar claims in this application did indeed receive a section
101 rejection from the examiner. See Office Action, Sept. 11, 2012, http://portal.uspto.
gov/external/portal/pair (select "Application Number"; search "12/680,073"; follow
"Image File Wrapper" hyperlink; follow "Non-Final Rejection" hyperlink).
141. See Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.
142. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1290.
143. See Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.
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administering step, the claim becomes a mirror of the claim
determined patent ineligible in Mayo and it would likely be patent
ineligible for the same reasons.
However, the addition of the modifying treatment step, a step
missing in Mayo, may be enough to transform the claim. First, it can
be argued that the modification of the treatment based on the
information determined in the second step of the claim is not
insignificant, post-solution activity. The Mayo Court interpreted the
claims as merely telling doctors to gather data from which they may
draw an inference. 4 4 There, the administering step added nothing to
patent-eligibility because it was a conventional activity already known
in the community. 145 However, sample claim 2, when analyzed as a
whole, arguably integrates the law of nature into the process by
taking a meaningful step, modifying treatment X, which would be
impossible to perform without the data derived from the natural law.
Therefore,
claim 2 applies the law of nature. Like the claims
7 sample
141
in Classen,
the modification step in combination with the
information gathered in the determining step may not constitute
insignificant post-solution activity and may transform the claim from
one reciting an abstract law of natural to one specifically applying the
law.' The interim guidance from the USPTO further supports the
notion that the modification step in sample claim 2 is more than
trivial post-solution activity, as it clearly limits the use
141 of the law of
chart.
a
on
diagnosis
a
recording
than
nature to more
Second, a good argument can be made that sample claim 2 does
not disproportionately tie up the natural correlation claimed, and
therefore should be patent eligible.4 9 Sample claim 2 does not inhibit
others from using the natural correlation between the nucleic acid
and sleep apnea to make future discoveries because the claim scope is
limited to the correlation's relation to treatment X. Additionally,
adding the modifying treatment step to sample claim 2 prevents the
claim from eliminating a doctor's ability to determine proper

144. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298.
145. Id.
146. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

This case was decided prior to Mayo, but relied on the same cases as the Supreme Court.
147.

Cf id. at 1067-68 (explaining the immunization requirement in accordance with a

lower-risk schedule

moved the claims "from abstract scientific principle to specific

application").
148. See Hirshfeld Memorandum, supra note 6.
149. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294.
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treatment based on the natural correlation cited because the claim
scope is limited only to the correlation's use with treatment X.""
Therefore, sample claim 2 does not cover all processes that use the
correlation between the nucleic acid and sleep apnea. It does not
generally limit a doctor's subsequent treatment decisions or anyone's
future discoveries. As in Diehr, the claimed method does not
preempt the use of the natural correlation, but only forecloses its use
in conjunction with the remaining limitations of the claim,
specifically, use with treatment X."'
Nevertheless, sample claim 2 is still susceptible to scrutiny for the
reason that "the line between a patentable 'process' and an
unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear."'5' First, it could easily be
argued that the additional steps, specifically, the modifying step, is
too general to make this claim patent-eligible. 3 To rectify this, and
increase the chances of patent-eligibility, additional information
about the specific steps of treatment X could be added. For example,
adding detailed information about treatment with a Continuous
Positive Airway Pressure ("CPAP")' 4 machine including, specific
pressure levels, durations, humidity levels, etc. and how they should
be modified, may help. 5'
Second, the claim may not be patent-eligible if the modifying
step is interpreted to be well-understood, routine, or conventional
activity.' ' Continuing with the CPAP example provided above, since
CPAP is a known method of treatment for sleep apnea, the Court
may interpret the modifying step as conventional post-solution
activity that does not transform an unpatentable law of nature into a
patent-eligible application of the law.'
But, the Court stated in
Mayo that a claim should be analyzed for subject matter eligibility as

150. See id. at 1302 (noting that in telling a treating doctor to measure metabolite

levels and consider the results, the claims tie up subsequent treatment decisions regardless
of if those decisions change from inferences drawn using the correlation).
151. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 187 (1982).
152. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
153. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294.
154. Continuous positive airway pressure is a type of ventilation therapy often
prescribed for those suffering from sleep apnea. See Sleep Apnea, MAYO CLINIC (July 24,
2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/sleep-apnea/DS00148/DSECTION=treatmentsand-drugs.
155. Angela L. Morrison, supra note 3 at 83.
156. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
157. See id.
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a whole 81 So, the novelty of CPAP as a treatment alone should have
no bearing on the analysis. Instead, the analysis should focus on the
combination of the CPAP treatment with the information gathered
from the nucleic acid-sleep apnea correlation. When the focus is
shifted to the combination of the treatment step with the correlation,
the claimed method no longer seems conventional.
However, it should be recognized that there is still a tension
between the methods of analysis the Court applied in Flook and
Diehr. In Flook, the Court held that the process was not patenteligible because once the algorithm was assumed to be part of the
prior art, the application contained no patentable invention."'
If that
same approach is applied here, sample claim 2 may be in trouble.
Therefore, the more novelty included in the claimed method, the
more likely the claim will be patent-eligible. 16" For example, including
the following limitation in sample claim 2 would likely make it patent
eligible: "wherein the step of determining whether or not the level of
expression of a nucleic acid in a mammal being treated for sleep
apnea changes during sleep includes performing assay 1 and then
performing assay 2," where the two assays are not conventionally
used together.1 6 ' Furthermore, a novel method of treatment, like a
new drug or a new use for an existing drug, 6 2 may increase the claim's
patent-eligibility.
Sample claim 2 can be modified to address at least some of the
arguments against patent eligibility. The level of specificity of
treatment X contained within the claim can be increased.
Additionally, a limitation can be added to specify how the
determining step is completed. After these changes, modified sample
claim 2 reads:
Administering CPAP treatment comprising two three hour
intervals of at least 6 cm H20 to a mammal before sleep for sleep
apnea, determining whether the level of expression of a nucleic acid in
a mammal being treated for sleep apnea increases, wherein an increase
of at least .2% in nucleic acid level during sleep indicates that CPAP is

158. See id. at 1297.
159. Id.
160. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 82-83.
161. Id.
162. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1302 (suggesting that method claims covering a new drug
or a new way of using an existing drug remain patent eligible). But see Morrison, supra
note 3, at 81.
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ineffective, and wherein determining whether the level of expression of
a nucleic acid in a mammal being treated for sleep apnea increases
during sleep comprises performing assay 1 and then performing assay
2, andmodifying CPAP treatment administered to a mammal being
treated for sleep apnea who exhibits an increase of at least .2% in
nucleic acid level, the modified CPAP treatment comprising three 2.5
hour intervals of at least 10 cm H20.
IX. The Intersection of Mayo and Akamai
Sample claim 2, in its original and modified forms, more likely
contains patent eligible subject matter post-Mayo after the addition
of a treatment step relating to the naturally occurring correlation.
However, it now also presents a problem of divided infringement.
The combination of steps included in sample claim 2, especially in its
modified form, requires at least 2 actors to complete them all. For
example, referring to modified sample claim 2, a person who
administers CPAP treatment will complete the first and third steps
and a scientist will perform the second step. It is very unlikely that
the scientist will also be administering the CPAP treatment. The
claim requires at least both a CPAP treatment actor and a scientist to
complete all of the steps of the claimed method, and therefore the
claim poses a divided infringement problem.
While the Court's decision in Mayo highlights one difficulty
practitioners face when drafting medical process patents, an
examination of the law of divided infringement highlights another:
drafting infringeable claims. The remainder of this note is dedicated
to the discussion of the problem of divided infringement for medical
process patents post-Mayo.
This section will begin with an
introduction to patent infringement focusing on induced
infringement.
The note will then explore the law of divided
infringement leading up to, and including the Akamai and McKesson
decision, and how the recent decision may effectively provide a
solution to the divided infringement problem medical process patents
face after Mayo. The note will conclude with a final analysis of the
proposed sample claim incorporating both the Mayo and Akamai
decisions.

X. Introduction to the Law of Patent Infringement
Patent infringement has generally been divided into two
categories, direct infringement and indirect infringement. Direct
infringement of a method claim requires a party perform each and

Summer 2013]

AKAMAI AND MEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS

333

every step of a claimed method.16 3 For a party to be liable for direct
infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a),"' 4 that party must
commit all of the acts necessary to infringe the patent, either
personally or vicariously.6 Indirect infringement of a method claim
occurs when a party participates in or encourages infringement, but
does not directly infringe the patent.1 6 Since the 1952 Patent Act
there have been two types of statutorily defined indirect
infringement:
inducement
and contributory
infringement. 67
Inducement refers to the active and knowing aiding and abetting of
another's direct infringement. 68 Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), "whoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer. 'l 9 Contributory infringement occurs when a party offers to
sell within the United States, or imports into the United States, a
component especially adapted for an infringing use.1
The goal of
indirect infringement is to provide a patent owner a remedy in
situations in which the direct infringer is either not 17truly
responsible
1
for the infringement, or when it is impractical to sue.
Induced infringement is both narrower and broader than direct
infringement.1 72 First, unlike direct infringement, which is a strict
liability offense, induced infringement requires that the accused
infringer know that the induced acts constitute patent infringement 173
4
and have the specific intent to encourage another's infringement.17
Second, induced infringement only creates liability if the inducement

163. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1306 (2012).
164. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefore, infringes the patent.").
165. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305.
166. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
167. See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225,

227 (2005).
168. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd. 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
170. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
171. Lemley, supra note 167, at 228.
172. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1308 (2012).
173. Global-Tech Appl., Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
174. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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produces actual infringement."' Actual infringement is required to
establish liability for inducement because attempted patent
infringement does not exist;' ' so if there is no infringement, there
cannot be indirect infringement.'
Finally, to be liable for direct
infringement of a method claim, a party must either perform all the
steps of the claimed method directly, or be in an agency-type
relationship with the actors performing the steps.7
In contrast,
inducement does not require any special relationship between the
parties beyond the performance of the acts of inducement
themselves.'
Divided infringement occurs when a patent may only be
infringed by combining the conduct of multiple actors."" The
problem of divided infringement in inducement cases generally occurs
when the claims at issue are process claims.8 For example, divided
infringement may occur when it is impossible for one actor to
complete all the steps of a claimed method."' 2 As explained above,
"when one person does not perform each and every step of the
claimed process, no person directly infringes the claim."18 However,
liability for inducement requires a finding of direct infringement. 84
Therefore, prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in Akamai, there
was a gaping hole in the statutory infringement scheme for patents
containing divided claims." 5

175. Akamai, 692 F.3d. at 1308.
176. This is because patent infringement is a strict liability offense. See In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
177. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
178. See Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
179. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308 ("[I]nducement does not require that the induced
party be an agent of the inducer or be acting under the inducer's direction or control ....

It is enough that the inducer 'cause[s], urge[s], encourage[s], or aid[s]' the infringing
conduct and that the induced conduct is carried out.").
180. See Mark A. Lemley et a]., Divided Infringement Claims, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 117

(2005). Divided infringement may also occur when some of the steps of the method are
completed outside of this country. See id. This scenario is outside the scope of this note.
181. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1307.
182. See Lemley et al., supra note 180 at 58.
183. Id.
184. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
185. See Lemley et al., supra note 180, at 118.
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XI. Cases Leading up to Akamai and McKesson
16
Prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in BMC v. Paymentech
there were two standards for finding joint infringementB The first
theory required an agency relationship between the jointly infringing
parties and the second required only "some connection" or
cooperation."" Leading up to BMC the Federal Circuit issued
opinions using both rationales."' In Cross Medical Products v.
Medtronic, the Court endorsed the agency standard for joint
infringement when analyzing infringement of an apparatus claim for a
bone anchor, determining that despite the presence of Medtronic
representatives in the operating room, the surgeons making the
apparatus were not agents of Medtronic."' The following year, the
Federal Circuit appeared to support the "some connection" standard
when it found proper a jury instruction explaining, "where
infringement is the result of the participation and combined actions of
one or more persons.., they are jointly liable for the
infringement."'9' The following line of cases continued to narrow the
requirement for joint infringement and set the stage for the Federal
Circuit's most recent pronouncement in Akamai.

A. BMC v. Paymentech: Direction or Control Standard
In BMC Resources v. Paymentech, BMC asserted two patents
covering PIN-less debit bill payment ("PDBP") methods against
Paymentech and claimed both direct infringement and inducement. 92
The patents at issue claim a method.9 for processing debit
186. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
187. Reza Dokhanchy, Cooperative Infringement: I Get by (Infringement Laws) with a
Little Help from My Friends,26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 145 (2011).

188. Id.
189. Id. at 146-47.
190. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
191. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
see Dokhanchy, supra note 187.
192. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1376 (2007).
193. BMC representative claim (claim 6): A method of paying bills using a
telecommunications network line connectable to at least one remote payment card
network via a payee's agent's system wherein a caller begins session using a
telecommunications network line to initiate a spontaneous payment transaction to payee,
the method comprising the steps of: prompting the caller to enter a payment number from
one or more choices of credit or debit forms of payment; prompting the caller to enter a
payment amount for the payment transaction; accessing a remote payment network
associated with the entered payment number, the accessed remote payment network
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transactions. 4 The method requires combined action by several
participants, "including the payee's agent (for example BMC), a
remote payment network (for example, an ATM network), and the
card-issuing financial institution."'9 5 Paymentech began marketing a
After a customer calls a
PIN-less debit bill payment service.'9'
merchant to pay a bill, the merchant collects the information and
sends it to Paymentech.197 Paymentech sends this information to a
debit network, which forwards it to an affiliated financial institution.19
The financial institution either authorizes or declines the payment,
and if authorized, charges the customer based on the merchant
provided information.'"9 Finally, the flow of information reverses, and
the status of the payment is sent from the financial institution to the
debit network, which sends it to Paymentech, which sends it back to
the merchant who informs the customer."") Since both BMC and
Paymentech agreed that the latter did not perform every step of
BMC's claimed method, the issue was if Paymentech was liable for
direct infringement despite the fact that other parties performed some
of the steps of the patented method.' 1
The BMC Court held that when the steps of the claimed method
are completed by multiple parties, the direct infringer must exert
direction or control over all of the steps, including those completed by
other parties."" It also reaffirmed the long-standing principle that
23
"inducement requires a predicate finding of direct infringement."

determining, during the session, whether sufficient available credit or funds exist in an
account associated with the payment number to complete the payment transaction, and
upon a determination that sufficient available credit or funds exist in the associated
account, charging the entered payment amount against the account with the entered
payment number, adding the entered payment amount to an account associated with the
entered account number, and storing the account number, payment number and payment
amount in a transaction file of the system. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1375.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See BMC Resources, Inc., 498 F.3d at 1376.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1378.
202. Id. at 1380-81.
203. See BMC Resources, Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v.
U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F. 3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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The Court recognized that the "direction or control" standard2 "4 for
joint infringement may provide a loop-hole to a finding of liability
when parties enter into "arms-length" agreements, but decided that it
did not warrant the expansion of the law of direct infringement."",
The Court was hesitant to expand the law of direct infringement
because doing so would "subvert the statutory scheme for indirect
infringement," and the concern over arms-length agreements could
be "offset by proper claim drafting. "
Thus, the only issue remaining was if Paymentech exerted
control over, or gave direction to, the debit networks and financial
institutions whose actions were necessary, in conjunction with
Paymentech's to complete all of the steps of the claimed method.7
The Court failed to find evidence of Paymentech's direction or
control over either the debit networks, or the financial institutions,
and therefore concluded that Paymentech was not liable for
infringement.28
B. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.
In Muniauction v. Thomson, the Court addressed joint
infringement in the context of internet auctioning." 9 The asserted
claims"" cover electronic methods for conducting municipal bond

204. The Court noted that contracting steps of a claimed method to another party
constitutes control, and therefore the contracting party may still be liable for direct

infringement. Id. at 1381.
205.

Id.

206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.

209. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Muniauction decision disposes of many of the asserted claims on the issue of
obviousness but reaches a discussion of divided infringement with respect to the surviving
dependent claims. Id. at 1328.
210. This is actually claim 1, which was found to be obvious, but is nonetheless

representative of the claims at issue: "In an electronic auction system including an issuer's
computer having a display and at least one bidder's computer having an input device and a
display, said bidder's computer being located remotely from said issuer's computer, said

computers being coupled to at least one electronic network for communicating data
messages between said computers, an electronic auctioning process for auctioning fixed

income financial instruments comprising: inputting data associated with at least one bid
for at least one fixed income financial instrument into said bidder's computer via said
input device; automatically computing at least one interest cost value based at least in part
on said inputted data, said automatically computed interest cost value specifying a rate
representing borrowing cost associated with said at least one fixed income financial
instrument; submitting said bid by transmitting at least some of said inputted data from
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auctions where a municipality offers its bonds to underwriters using a
web browser, the underwriters bid for and purchase the bonds, and
then resell them to the public." ' The claimed invention provides an
integrated system for the auctions without the use of additional
specialized software and provides all parties to the auction the ability
to monitor its status.212 The parties agreed that no single party
performs every step of the claimed method because at least the step
of inputting a bid is completed by the bidder and the majority of the
remaining steps are completed by the auctioneer's system.2 '
The Court reaffirmed, and then elevated, its holding in BMC
Resources. The Court reiterated that BMC Resources presented the
proper standard for determining when a method claim is directly
infringed by the actions of multiple parties; if one party exerts
direction or control over the entire process.214 However, the Court
then found that despite Thomson's control over access to its system
and its instructions to bidders on its use, it was not liable for direct
infringement.'5 It expressly disavowed the district court's reading of
On Demand Mach. Corp.6 as requiring a "connection less than 'direct
control,"' and raised the standard for joint infringement to those
situations in which the accused direct infringer is vicariously liable for
the acts performed by another.2
C. Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc.
In Golden Hour Data Systems v. emsCharts, Inc.2" the Court
further narrowed the "control or direction" standard for joint

said bidder's computer over said at least one electronic network: and communicating at
least one message associated with said submitted bid to said issuer's computer over said at
least one electronic network and displaying, on said issuer's computer display, information
associated with said bid including said computed interest cost value, wherein at least one
of the inputting step, the automatically computing step, the submitting step, the
communicating step and the displaying step is performed using a web browser." Id. at
1322-23.
211. Id. at 1321-22.
212. Id. at 1322.
213.

Id. at 1328-29.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1329.
See Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1329.
On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingrame Indus., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d at 1329.
Golden Hour Data Systems v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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infringement by finding that a "strategic partnership" between
allegedly joint infringers was not enough to establish liability! 9
The asserted patent covered an integrated system for dispatching
medical services and collecting and managing patient clinical and
billing data. 2"' The accused infringers, emsCharts and Softtech,
produce medical charting and flight dispatch software respectively. 1
The two companies "enabled their two programs to work together
and collaborated to sell the two programs as a unit."2 ' The Court
repeated the control or direction standard and summarily affirmed
the district court's grant of JMOL,
agreeing that there was insufficient
23
infringement.
joint
of
evidence
D. Akamai and McKesson
In Akamai v. Limelight and McKesson v. Epic Systems
(combined on appeal), the Court addressed joint infringement
specifically in the context of induced patent infringement. 224 While
many believed the Court would address the continued use of the
single-entity rule, the requirement that a single party perform all of
the steps of a claimed method to be liable for direct infringement, the
Court declined to do So.2 Instead, the decision focused on whether
an actor may be held liable for induced infringement if she has
partially performed the method herself and induced another to
commit the remaining steps or has simply induced other actors to
collectively perform the steps without a single direct infringer.226 The
Court expressly overruled its previous decision in BMC Resources
and held that for a party to be found liable for inducement all the
steps of the claimed method must be performed, but every step does
not have to be performed by a single entity. 22 The Court argued that
this was not a significant departure from joint infringement
jurisprudence and rested its holding on statutory construction,

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 1371, 1381-82.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1380-81.
Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id.
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analogous liability in other areas of the law, precedent, and sound
policy.22
Facts
The patents at issue in Akamai recite methods for delivery of
web content by placing some of a provider's content on servers and
modifying the provider's website to instruct users to retrieve the
content from the server.22 Akamai alleged Limelight Networks, Inc.
was liable for both direct and induced infringement through the
maintenance of a network of servers that allow delivery of web
content placed on its servers .23" Limelight instructs its users on how to
modify their websites to access the server based information, but does
not modify the sites directly.2"1
McKesson filed a complaint against Epic Systems Corp. alleging
induced infringement of a patent covering a method of electronic
communication between a healthcare provider and their patient 2
Epic Systems licenses its "MyChart" software to healthcare
organizations, which permits them to communicate electronically with
patients.2 3' Epic does not complete any of the steps of the patented
method, and instead, those steps are completed by the patients who
initiate the communications34 and the healthcare providers who
perform the remaining steps.2
Statutory Construction
The Court asserts that a statutory analysis of section 271(b)2 35 of
the Patent Act supports its proposition that "requiring proof that
there has been direct infringement as a predicate for induced
infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a single party
would be liable as a direct infringer."3 ' In comparing the language of
section 271(b) 37 with section 271(a),2"' the statute covering direct

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Akamai Tech., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
See Akamai Tech., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1308-09 (emphasis in original).
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010).

238.

Id.
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infringement, it becomes apparent that section 271(b) is structured
differently. 39 Section 271(a) states that one who performs any of the
specified acts (for example, making, using, selling ... a patented
invention) infringes the patent. 241 But, section 271(b) states that one
who induces infringement will be liable as an infringer.14' The Court
asserts that nothing in the text of section 271(b) limits "infringement"
to acts by a single actor.242 Instead, the Court suggests that
"infringement" refers to the acts required to infringe the patent. 243 In
responding to the dissent's argument that the Court's approach
defines direct infringement differently with respect to sections 271(a)
and 271(b), the Court explains that section 271(b) can be interpreted
as describing another type infringing conduct, i.e., inducement, and
nothing in the text of either subsection suggests that inducement must
fit into an act that would expose a person to liability under 271(a).44
Additionally, the Court relied on the legislative history of 1952 Patent
Act to lend support for its statutory analysis.
Comparisonto Criminaland Tort Law
The Court recognized that holding an inducing party liable for an
innocent party's underlying acts is not a concept unique to patent law.
The Federal Criminal Code section2 4 1 for aiding and abetting a crime
against the United States is structured similarly to section 271 and has
been interpreted to permit conviction of the inducer despite the
acquittal of the principal.247 Tort law treats liability for inducing
innocent actors similarly.2 4 The Court places great weight on the
parallels between tort law and patent law because the doctrine of

239. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309.
240. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).

241. Id. § 271(b).
242. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1313 (supporting this contention by comparing alternate parts of the Patent
Act, for example, sections 271 (e)(2) and 271 (f)).
245. See id. at 1309-10 (referencing the intended broad scope of the inducement
provision and testimony given by Giles Rich during hearings on the legislation that
indirect infringement provisions were intended to apply to cases of divided infringement).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)-(b) (2012).
247. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1311 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 19
(1980)).
248. Id. at 1311-12.
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indirect infringement, which was codified in section 271(b) in the 1952
Patent Act, was based on the principles of joint tort feasance.249
Precedent
The Court explained that the misstep in its prior decisions
occurred when the rule explained in Dynacore, that inducement
liability requires an underlying act of infringement, was extended2 ' 5° to
require that a single-entity commit the entire act of infringement.21
The extension of the law of inducement to include the single-entity
rule was not supported by the Dynacore decision that set out the
original proposition.
Nor is it supported by the Supreme Court's
decision in Aro Mfg. Co., v. Convertible Top Replacement Co."' In
Aro, the Court found no contributory infringement not because the
infringement required multiple actors, but because the acts
completed 1 4 were considered "repairs," not "reconstruction," and
therefore were not infringement at all. 5 Without an underlying act
of infringement, the Court held there could not be contributory
infringement.' 6 Additionally, the Court noted that the Aro decision
involved infringement of product claims, which rarely, and did not in
this case, implicate the
divided infringement question it was
7
addressing in Akamai.1
Furthermore, the Court explained its prior use of the words
"some party" to describe the party accused of direct infringement in
an induced infringement context was merely a recitation of the
principle that a direct infringement is a prerequisite for induced
infringement. 5' The Court traced this proposition back to the Aro
decision. ' Since the Aro decision did not hold that a single direct
infringer is required, the use of "some party" was not an indication
249. Id. at 1312-13.
250. BMC Resources Inc., v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
251. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1315.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. The Aro case involved a product claim. As the Akamai Court explained, "The
party that adds the final element to the combination 'makes' the infringing product and
thus is liable for direct infringement even if others make portions." Id.
255. Aro Mfg. Co., v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961);
Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1315-16.

256. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1315-16.
257.

Id. at 1305, 1316.

258. Id. at 1316.
259.

Id.
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that a single entity must commit all the steps of the direct
infringement.""° The Federal Circuit explained that its cases, as well
as those predating Aro,2 ' had never held otherwise. 2 As a result of
its precedential analysis, the Court found that BMC, and the cases
following it, changed the law with respect to induced infringement of
method claims.26
Sound Policy and CongressionalIntent
The Court also found that requiring a single entity commit the
underlying acts of direct infringement in order to create liability for
inducement served no "sound policy based purpose" as it "invites
evasion of the principles of patent infringement.' ',1 4 There is no
reason to hold a party that induces multiple parties to collectively
commit an act of direct infringement differently from one who
induces a single party to. 6 In either case, the impact on the patent
holder is the same. It would be even more nonsensical to immunize
from liability for indirect infringement an inducer who completes
some of the steps of the claimed method himself, but induces another
party to finish the job.267 A party who engages in acts of underlying
infringement may be considered more culpable than one who does
not perform any of the acts at all, and as long as the underlying act is
completed, the harm to the patentee is identical.2 ' The Court
concluded that Congress did not intend section 271(b) to be
interpreted to permit parties to skirt liability without any
"countervailing [societal] benefits."2"'

260. Id.
261. See id. at 1317-18 (explaining that prior decisions in Solva Waterproof Glue Co. v.
Perkins Glue Co., 251 F. 64 (7th Cir. 1918), Peerless Equipment Co. v. W.H. Miner, Inc.,
93 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1937), and Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) support the contention that a single-party direct infringer is not required to
create liability for inducement).

262. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1316.
263. Id. at 1318.
264.
265.

Id. at 1317-18.
Id. at 1309.

266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309.

269. Id. at 1318.
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XII. Implications of Akamai and McKesson on Sample Claim
In order to adequately explain the implications of Akamai in the
context of medical process patents, let us reexamine the sample
claims previously presented. Sample claim 1, an exemplary claim that
may have been patent-eligible prior to Mayo, recites:
A method for assessing the effectiveness of a treatment for sleep
apnea, wherein said method comprises:
determining whether or not the level of expression of a nucleic
acid in a mammal being treated for sleep apnea changes during sleep,
wherein a change in said level during sleep indicates that said treatment
is ineffective.
This claim does not present the divided infringement problem
addressed in Akamai because it can clearly be infringed by the acts of
a single party. The claim only recites one step that requires
affirmative action, the determining step. It is possible for this step to
be completed by a single party; for example a scientist performing
two tests in a lab and comparing the results.2
Therefore, before
Mayo, if this claim met the other requirements of the Patent Act and
issued, it could be enforced against the lab employing the scientist
performing the test or any party inducing the lab to do so.
In contrast, let us reexamine the original sample claim 2:271
A method for assessing the effectiveness of a treatment for sleep
apnea, wherein said method comprises:administering treatment X for
sleep apnea to a mammal before sleep, determining whether or not the
level of expression of a nucleic acid in a mammal being treated for
sleep apnea changes duringsleep, wherein a change in said level during
sleep indicates that treatment X is ineffective, and modifying treatment
X based on the level change identified.

270. In Myriad's amicus curiae brief, it is suggested that the wherein step is generally
completed by a different party than the determining step. This argument may have been
made because the Supreme Court had not yet decided the Mayo case at the time the brief
was written, and Myriad may have been hedging its bets. Either way, the Mayo decision
has significantly increased the likelihood additional steps that must be completed by other
actors are required. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae, Myriad Genetics, Inc., in
Support of Neither Party at 14, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
271. Original sample claim 2 is used to simplify the example, however, modified

sample claim 2 also presents a divided infringement problem. See supra Intersection of
Mayo and Akamai, section IX.
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This claim is more likely patentable post-Mayo," but poses a
divided infringement problem. This claim is nearly impossible to
infringe by a single entity and the steps can easily be divided between
parties who are not in an agency relationship. For example, the
administering and modifying steps would likely be performed by a
doctor, while the determining step, as explained above, would likely
be completed by a scientist in a lab. 73 Thus, a common scenario
would include a diagnostic testing laboratory marketing the sleep
apnea test to a physician, who would administer the initial treatment
and then send the samples to the lab. The lab would then determine
the results and provide guidance to the doctor, who would then
modify treatment X"' Additionally, it is rare for the lab and the
treating doctor to be an agency relationship."' And, even if the two
would generally be in this type of relationship, it is easy for savvy
parties to avoid. 27' This means that prior to the Akamai decision, this
claim was unenforceable. Neither the doctor nor the lab can be
classified as a direct infringer.. because neither of them completes all
the steps of the claimed method, and they are in the type of
relationship that would categorize them as a single entity. No party
can be held liable for indirect infringement because there is no act of
underlying infringement. Now, however, post-Akamai, the patent
holder of sample claim 2 would have redress. While it is clear that
neither party could be held liable as a direct infringer, it would be
possible to hold the diagnostic testing laboratory, or any other party
for that matter, liable for inducement (as long as the other elements
for inducement were satisfied). For at least inducement liability, it
no longer matters which party completed which step of the claimed

272. See supra Implications of Mayo on Sample Claim and Proposed Remedies section
VIII;

Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2012 WL

3264941, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2012) (noting the inclusion of the mandatory application
step missing from the claims in Mayo, which is included here).
273. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae, Myriad Genetics, Inc., in Support of
Neither Party at 14, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Akamai does not change the law of direct infringement and therefore neither
party would be liable for direct infringement post Akamai either.
278. For example, the knowledge requirement. See supra Introduction to the Law of
Patent Infringement.
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method or what their relationship to each other is. So, as long as all
the steps of a claimed method are completed, Akamai ensures that an
inducer can be held liable. Therefore, while Mayo likely requires the
actions of additional actors be included in medical process patent
claims to ensure patent-eligibility, Akamai allows those patents to be
enforced, at least in the inducement context.
While Akamai provides a solution for patents holders
confronting a divided infringement problem, the additional
requirements for inducement liability, specifically the intent
requirement, may pose an additional barricade to enforcement.
Inducement requires not only an act of direct infringement, but also
that the alleged inducer possessed affirmative intent to cause the
direct infringement." ' Therefore, for an alleged infringer to be held
liable for inducement of a process patent, the patent holder must
prove: the alleged infringer knew of the patent, that he knowingly
induced the completion of all of the steps of the claimed method, and
that he possessed a specific intent to encourage the completion of all
of the steps of the claimed method."" The intent requirement is
concerning here because an alleged inducer may not possess the
required intent for the completion of the treatment step.
Unfortunately, the intent requirement for inducement and the subject
matter eligibility requirements described in Mayo place many
applying for medical process patents in a precarious position. The
more specific the limitations in the claim, the more likely the claim
will overcome the walls erected by Mayo. But, the more specific the
limitations of the claim, the more difficult it will be to prove the intent
prong of inducement if the claims require divided infringement.
A comparison of sample claim 2 in its original and modified
forms may help explain the problem of proving intent for inducement
of some medical process claims. The following analysis assumes the
diagnostic test provider is the alleged inducer. In original sample
claim 2, intent could likely be proven for the administering step
because the test provider must intend for the doctor to administer
treatment X in order to provide a proper sample for the diagnostic
test. The test provider would likely complete the determining step
itself with the provided sample. The issue in this claim is really in
proving intent for the final step, modifying the treatment. If the step
remains fairly general, it is easier to prove that the test provider

279.

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

280.

See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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intended for the doctor to make a change in his practice based on the
results provided. Why would the doctor send the sample for testing if
he hadn't been told what to do with the results? Put another way,
how would the lab market the test if it did not explain how its results
could be used to treat patients?
However, considering modified sample claim 2, the more specific
the administering and treatment steps become, the more difficult it
will be to prove the test provider possessed intent for all of the
limitations in the claims. For example, modified sample claim 2
contains detailed information about how to administer CPAP
treatment and exactly how the treatment should be modified after the
lab provides test results. Since the alleged inducer must possess an
affirmative intent to cause the direct infringement, he must intent for
the doctor to complete the treatment step with every claimed
limitation, no matter how specific. It would be significantly harder to
prove that the test provider possessed specific intent for the doctor to
modify the treatment in such a particular manner.
This concern may be overcome if the same entity provides the
diagnostic services and the method of treatment. For example,
referring back to sample claim 2, if the test provider also provides
CPAP devices, it is more likely that the patent holder would be able
to prove the test provider intended the doctor to modify treatment in
the way specified in modified claim 2. While this seems slightly
improbable with the method of treatment specified in the sample
claims here, if the method of treatment includes the use of a
pharmaceutical drug the arrangement becomes more realistic."1
Since the FDA is encouraging the use of companion

diagnostics282

when applying for approval of therapeutic products, more companies
have an incentive to provide both a diagnostic test and a method of
treatment."' So, if the method of treatment includes the use of a
pharmaceutical drug, the likelihood of a patent holder being able to

281. See Andrew Pollack, A Push to Tie New Drugs to Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/health/pressure-to-link-drugs-and-companiondiagnostics.html.
282. The FDA defines a companion diagnostic as a test used to assist doctors to
determine whether a patient with a particular disease or condition should receive a
particular therapeutic product. See Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
Administration in Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN (July
14, 2011), available at www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm262292.htm#ftl (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
283. See Pollack, supra note 281.
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prove inducement by such a company may be greater. 4 Additionally,
if the FDA's encouragement of companion diagnostics is extended to
approval for medical devices then the problem of proving intent may
become less severe.

XIII. Conclusion
Many believe that the patent system has provided the protection
necessary to make leaps forward in many technological industries, but
especially in those, like medical diagnostics, involving significant risk
and substantial investment."'
Akamai serves to protect those
investments by safeguarding the value of many patents containing
claims that can only be jointly infringed. Akamai is especially
important for those in in medical diagnostics since Mayo increased
the likelihood that medical process claims will pose a divided
infringement problem. While the Akamai decision is more limited
than many had hoped and does not abolish all obstacles to
enforcement, medical process patents, and those on diagnostic
methods in particular, live to be valued another day.

284. Note that if the method of treatment is a new drug, or a new use of an existing
drug, Mayo may not pose a bar to patentability. In that case, the new drug would be

patent eligible subject matter. There may still be a problem of divided infringement.
While one entity may provide the diagnostic results and access to the treatment, another

party (i.e. a medical professional) would still need to interface with the patient.
285.

See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae, Myriad Genetics, Inc., in Support of

Neither Party at 1, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).

